Conflict and Defense is a general theory of conflict as a pattern common to virtually all types of social interaction. It considers: static and dynamic models; game theory; viability; ecological and epidemiological models of conflict; parties to conflict; and economic, industrial, international, ideological, and ethical conflicts as special cases. It discusses the control and resolution of conflict and concludes with an epilogue on the breakdown of national defense as a result of nuclear weapons and the long-range missile. (The Social Sciences Citation Index® (SSCI®) indicates that this book has been cited in over 360 publications.)

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My interest in conflict undoubtedly goes back to early childhood experiences during World War I in Liverpool—when I was 7, my uncle came back from the trenches with a look in his eyes I have never forgotten—and to a conviction at about age 14 that war was a phenomenon so outrageous that I could not participate in it, which later led me from my Methodist upbringing into the Society of Friends. I went to Oxford in 1928 with a scholarship in chemistry, but the unemployment and poverty that I saw around me, especially in Liverpool, convinced me that economic problems were most urgent, and so I became an economist, ending up in the US.

I went to what was then Iowa State College (now Iowa State University) at Ames in 1943 to become a labor economist. This experience convinced me that all social scientists were studying the same thing, the social system, which one had to look at as a totality. Then, at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford (1954-1955), a little group of us met to consider how to direct the social sciences toward the study of conflict and peace in the light of the threat of nuclear war, which could destroy us. The group included Anatol Rapoport, Herbert Kelman, and Stephen Richardson (the son of Lewis F. Richardson, whose remarkable works we all read in microfilm; they were not published until 1960-2). Out of this came the Journal of Conflict Resolution and the Center for Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan in 1956, the product of a remarkable interdisciplinary group that included Robert Angell, the sociologist; David Singer, the political scientist; and some others. From this lively interdisciplinary intercourse came what is really a new discipline of conflict studies, what the French call “polemologie.” Conflict and Defense may well be cited as a pioneer work in this new field.

The book was actually written during a year that I spent at the University of the West Indies in Jamaica (1959-1960). Anyone could detect, I think, that the book was written by an economist. The basic economic and game theory models are very fundamental to it. It also, however, was much influenced by the work of Lewis Richardson.1 It shows the influence of another trend of thought that came out of that remarkable year at Stanford, the general systems movement, especially the application of ecological and epidemiological models to social systems. An important principle that emerges is the frequent, great divergence between the images of conflict in the minds of the parties and the objective realities of the conflict, as might be revealed by a study of actual costs and benefits.

Not long after Conflict and Defense was published, the International Peace Research Association was founded, which represents a community of scholars around the world who specialize in what might be called “applied conflict studies,” particularly centered on the management of conflict and the diminution of its social cost and the increase of its benefits. There is now an increasing profession of people who might be described as “conflict managers,” symbolized in the biennial National Conference on Peace-making and Conflict Resolution.

My own continuing work in the field is reflected in volume 5 of my collected papers,2 my book, Stable Peace,3 and lectures I gave at IIASA.4